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Abstract - We investigate the relationship between social participation and the hours worked in the market. 
Social participation is the component of social capital that measures individuals’ engament in groups, 
associations and non-governmental organizations. We provide a model of consumer choice where social 
participation may be either a substitute or a complement to material consumption – depending on whether 
participation is instrumentally or non-instrumentally motivated – and where a local environment with greater 
social participation increases the return to individual participation. We carry out an empirical investigation of 
this framework using survey data on United States for the period 1972-2004. We find that non-instrumental 
social participation substantially decreases the hours worked, while instrumental social participation 
substantially increases them. Moreover, evidence is consistent with the idea that a local environment with greater 
social participation fosters individual social participation. 
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 1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the relationships between social participation and the number of hours
worked in the market. Social participation is the component of social capital that measures indi-
viduals’ engagement in groups, associations and non-governmental organizations. To this aim we
construct a simple model of consumer choice where individuals derive their well-being from both
consumption and social participation, and where average social participation increases the returns
to individual participation. We then estimates the relationship between social participation and
hours worked using survey data from the United States for the period 1972-2004.
In the last decades, participation in groups, associations and non-governmental organizations
has been declining in the United States (Paxton, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Robinson and Jackson, 2001;
Costa and Kahn, 2003) while hours worked in the market seem to have been increasing (Schor, 1992).
It is possible that longer work hours have reduced the time available to pursue social interactions,
though this might have been mitigated by a steady decrease in housework hours (Aguiar and Hurst,
2007).1 Intuitively, longer hours of work reduce physical and psychological resources available for
other activities and thus may decrease social interactions.
Evidence on this point, however, is controversial. Putnam (1996) argues that individuals who
work long hours are more inclined to civic engagement. Costa and Kahn (2003) ﬁnd that increased
female labor force participation has a negative eﬀect on membership in community groups. Rupas-
ingha et al. (2006) ﬁnd that female labor force participation has a positive eﬀect on membership
in community groups. Putnam (2000) uses data from the General Social Surveys to show that em-
ployed individuals are more likely to belong to civic groups than those outside of the labor force.
Finally, Saﬀer and Lamiraud (2008) test the eﬀect of an employment law that reduced hours of work
in France and ﬁnd no evidence that the extra hours went to increased social interactions.
What all these studies have in common is that they assume, explicitly or implicitly, that the
1Aguiar and Hurst (2007) suggest that in the period 1965-2003 leisure time is increased of a few hours per week.
However, their data also suggest that in the period 1985-2003 leisure has not increased anymore while hours of work
in the market have increased, at least for women.
1causation link between hours worked and social capital runs from the ﬁrst to the second. However,
there are reasons to think that reverse causation might be at work as well. In particular, this is
suggested by the recent evidence on the relationship between social capital and well-being. Several
studies which exploits survey data from diﬀerent countries converge to indicate that social capital is
strongly correlated to people’s subjective well-being (see the pioneering studies by Helliwell, 2003,
2006, 2008; Helliwell and Putnam, 2004).2 Moreover, Becchetti et al. (2009) provide a causal analysis
showing that the relational component of social capital has a strong impact on people’s subjective
well-being. In sum, evidence suggests that individuals derive their well-being not only from the
consumption of material goods but also from the relationships that they maintain with other persons.3
Furthermore, social participation is likely to be inﬂuenced by the local social environment. More
precisely, the idea here is that average social participation aﬀects the returns to individual social
participation. This kind of mechanism, which is mostly based on the idea of network externalities, has
already been theorized in analysis of growth models with optimizing (Bartolini and Bonatti, 2002,
2008; Antoci et al., 2007) and non-optimizing agents (Antoci and Bartolini, 2004). Such models
assume that social capital and private consumption are partial substitutes. The basic message of
these models is that endogenous growth may be sustained by the depletion of social capital. The
intuition is the following. Growth generates negative externalities which reduce social capital and
force individuals to rely increasingly on private material goods to prevent a decline in their well-
being. This, in turn, forces individals to work longer hours. In this way individuals contribute to an
increase in output. This feeds back into the negative externalities, giving rise to a further diminution
in social capital to which agents react again by increasing output, and so forth. A self-reinforcing
mechanism thus operates whereby growth generates negative externalities and negative externalities
2Bruni and Stanca (2008) and Bartolini et al. (2011) focus on relational goods – also referred to as non-instrumental
relational activities – and ﬁnd similar results. See also Bartolini and Bilancini (2010) for a review of recent evidence
on the relationship between relational goods and subjective well-being.
3The literature on subjective well-being quickly developed in recent years and gained large visibility (for a recent
survey see Stutzer and Frey, 2010). This literature largely utilizes answers to survey questions concerning the degree of
happiness or life satisfaction of individuals. The main reasons for the popularity of this literature lies in the abundance
and the reliability of these data. Indeed, they are very well correlated with objective data on people’s well-being.
2generate growth. One important implication of such a circular mechanism is a negative relationship
between social capital and the labor supply.
In this paper we attempt to answer three questions. First, to what extent does causation go
from social participation to hours worked, and to what extent the other way around? As we have
argued above, two causal links are theoretically possible: from social participation to hours worked
and from hours worked to social participation. Second, to what extent are work hours aﬀected by
the social environment? Indeed, due to network spillovers, communities characterized by a large
endowment of social capital may make it more attractive for an individual to participate in groups,
associations and non-governmental organization. This is important because, if more social partici-
pation at the individual level causes work hours to shrink, then a larger endowment of social capital
at the community level may be the cause of a smaller supply of labor. Third, do hours worked relate
to instrumental and non-instrumental social participation in the same way? Instrumental social
participation is refers to participation in groups, associations and non-governmental organizations
as an instrument to something else. Instead, non-instrumental social participation refers to partic-
ipation in groups, associations and non-governmental organizations for its own sake. The question
arises from the evidence that diﬀerent forms of social participation correlate diﬀerently with sub-
jective well-being. Indeed, Bartolini et al. (2011) show that non-instrumental social participation is
positively correlated with subjective well-being while instrumental social participation is negatively
correlated with subjective well-being.
In order to explore possible answers to these questions we develop and test a model of time
allocation between hours of work and relational activities. The key features of our model are the fol-
lowing. First, instrumental social participation improves labor productivity, while non-instrumental
social participation fosters relational consumption. Second, material consumption and relational
consumption are partial substitutes. As a result, non-instrumental social participation decreases
the hours worked while instrumental social participation increases them. Third, because of network
externalities, local average social participation of a given type has a positive impact on the returns
to individual social participation of the same type. This results in local social participation boosting
3individual social participation. We test these predictions by estimating a structural equation model
using survey data from the United States for the period 1972-2004. Estimates turn out to be con-
sistent with the predictions of our model. In particular, our ﬁgures suggest that a small exogenous
shock to average local participation in groups, associations or non-governmental organizations can
generate further important changes in individual behaviour that amplify the initial shock and that
result in the economy shifting towards a new equilibrium where average social participation and work
hours are substantially diﬀerent.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we deﬁne concepts and measures. In section 3
we develop the theoretical model, while in section 4 we describe the data, the empirical strategy
and the estimates. Finally, in section 5 we summarize our ﬁndings and comment on their potential
implications.
2 Instrumental and Non-Instrumental Social Participation
Healy et al. (2001) gives a deﬁnition of social capital, consistent with that of Putnam (2000), as
“networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within
or among groups”. This deﬁnition refers to a very far-reaching concept. Indeed, in its statistical
embodiments, social capital includes measures that are quite dissimilar, ranging from voter turnout,
to trust in institutions, to the quantity and quality of intimate relationships and social bonds among
individuals.
In this paper we focus on social participation, namely the component of social capital that mea-
sures the participation in groups, associations and non-governmental organizations. Social partici-
pation can be instrumental or non-instrumental, depending on the motivation behind the decision to
participate. Instrumental social participation is motivated by the expectation to obtain something
else in return. Typically, this kind of social participation is aimed at securing access to material
consumption. Lobbying, professional networking, and participation in business clubs, are examples
instrumental social participation. Instead, non-instrumental social participation, which substantially
contributes to the production and consumption of relational goods (Uhlaner, 2009; Gui and Sugden,
42005), is done for its own sake. The concept of relational good refers to the quantity and the quality
of non-instrumental relations experienced by an individual who interacts with other individuals. Ma-
jor psychological schools emphasize that non-instrumental social participation is fueled by intrinsic
motives issuing from within an individual: according to Deci (1975, pag.105), “one is said to be in-
trinsically motivated to perform an activity when one receives no apparent reward except the activity
itself.” The distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental motivations is well-established
in social sciences. Various empirical studies in psychology have found that instrumental motivations
can crowd out non-instrumental ones. This has generated a lively debate in psychology (Sansone
and Harackiewicz, 1975), but it has also attracted interest among the economists (Frey, 1997; Kreps,
1997; Benabou and Tirol, 2003; Frey and Jegen, 2001).
In this paper we distinguish between instrumental and non-instrumental social participation by
adopting the distinction introduced by Knack (2003): Putnam’s groups and Olson’s groups. The
distinction between Olson’s and Putnam’s groups is based on the classic works of Olson (1982) and
Putnam (1993). They provide conﬂicting views about the impact of social participation on economic
performance and social conﬂict. Olson (1982) emphasizes the tendency of associations to act as
‘distributional coalitions’ which lobby for policies that protect the interest of special groups at the
expenses of the society as a whole. Since these ‘distributional coalitions’ impose large costs to the
rest of the society they negatively impact on economic growth. Growth-inhibiting policies such as
tariﬀs, tax breaks, competition-reducing regulations or subsidies are the undesirable result of the
lobbying activity of associations. Instead, according to Putnam (1993) associations are a source of
general trust and social ties leading to governmental and economic eﬃciency. These diﬀerent views
motivated empirical tests aimed at verifying if diﬀerent horizontal associations, called Olsonian and
Putnamian, have a diﬀerent impact on economic growth (Knack, 2003; Gleaser et al., 2000). We
model the diﬀerence between Olson’s and Putnam’s groups as follows: Olson’s groups enter the
production functions of material goods (standard consumption goods) while Putnam’s groups enter
the production functions of relational goods.
53 The Model
3.1 The consumer problem
Basically, our model is a variant of the standard consumer problem where we introduce (non-strategic)
peer eﬀects and extend the consumption set to contain, besides material goods, also relational goods.
Peer eﬀects arise through social participation. We distinguish between two kinds of social partici-
pation: in Olson’s groups (motivated by instrumental reasons) and in Putnam’s groups (motivated
by non-instrumental reasons). We assume that both individual and average social participation
can potentially inﬂuence consumption. More precisely, participation in Putnam’s groups fosters
consumption of relational goods while participation in Olson’s groups fosters material consumption.
We consider a population of individuals that face the choice of how to spend their time endowment
t 2 R+. No assumption is made on the size of population, that can be either ﬁnite or inﬁnite. The
time endowment can be spent either to work, to have leisure or in social participation. We denote
with h 2 R+ the time spent working, with l 2 R+ the leisure time, with mo 2 R+ the time spent in
Olson’s groups, and with mp 2 R+ the time spent in Putnam’s groups. Therefore, the time constraint
is given by t = l + h + mp + mo. Moreover, we denote with mp 2 R+ and mo 2 R+ the averages in
the population of the time spent participating in, respectively, Olson’s groups and Putnam’s groups.
We abstract from both prices and wages that we assume ﬁxed in the present analysis.
Material consumption is given by c = g(h;mo;mo) where g is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable
function with gh > 0, gmo > 0 and gmo > 0. Consumption of relational goods is given r = f(mp;mp)
where f is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable function with fmp > 0 and fmp > 0. The idea
is that material consumption is obtained combining productive activities and instrumental social
participation, while relational goods are obtained from non-instrumental social participation. Note
that leisure does not contribute to either the production of material goods or the production of
relational goods. Indeed, here we refer to leisure are pure otium.
Individuals’ utility function is u(c;r;l), strictly increasing in all arguments and thrice continuously
diﬀerentiable. The consumer problem is therefore:
6max
fh;l;mo;mpg
u(c;r;l) ; s:t: :
t = l + h + mp + mo ;
c = g(h;mo;mo) :
r = f(mp;mp)
(1)











System (2)-(4) is an equilibrium condition for this consumer economy with social participation. On
the basis of (2)-(4), however, we cannot establish how average social participation aﬀects individual
choices. The reason is that social participation, besides generating externalities, can also aﬀect
the individual incentives to work, to have leisure, and to participate in groups, associations and
non-governmental organizations. In particular, how average social participation aﬀects individual
choices in equilibrium depends on the complementarity between goods and among diﬀerent kinds
of social participations. In the following we build more structure into the model by introducing
complementarities among activities and substitutability between goods.
3.2 Substitute goods and complementary activities
We let individuals have homothetic preferences over consumption and leisure, with consumption
of relational goods and consumption of material goods being partial substitutes. The idea is that
individuals can always compensate, though in an increasingly costly way, the consumption of one






7where 0 <  < 1 is an index of the importance of material goods relative to relational goods, while
0 <  < 1 represents the fraction of time spent in activities giving rise to consumption.
Participation in Olson’s groups is both an essential input and a complement to labor in the pro-
duction of material goods. Essentiality is assumed for technical reasons and it is by no means crucial
for our argument. Complementarity instead is important. It can arise because of the distributional
advantages provided by participation in Olson’s groups or because material rewards to work directly
depend on participation (e.g., greater access to relevant information, better informal training, etc).
Participation in Putnam’s groups is essential to the production of relational goods. Again, this is a
technical assumption and by no means crucial.
Average local participation is a complement to individual participation. Average social partici-
pation may aﬀect the returns to individual participation in several ways: through the impact on the
average size of groups (larger groups are more eﬀective in providing greater beneﬁts to participants)
or through its eﬀects on the likelihood of within-group relationships (greater average participation
increases the likelihood of experiencing beneﬁcial interactions). In particular, average local partici-
pation in Olson’s groups may positively aﬀect the rewards to work and to individual participation
because it aﬀects the strength of coalitions thereby increasing the probability to obtain distributional
advantages. Average local participation in Putnam’s groups may positively aﬀect the rewards to in-
dividual participation because the group is more likely to fulﬁll its objectives or because participation







where 0 < 1 < 1, 0 < 2 < 1 and 0 <  < 1. Note that both production functions generate positive
cross derivatives between average social participation and individual social participation. This is a
standard way to model complementarities.
















which gives the following FOCs:
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From (11) and (12) we see that, in equilibrium, both a greater h and a greater m
o imply a lower
m
p and viceversa. This is because both h and m
o are complementary inputs in the production of
material goods while m
p is an input in the production of relational goods.
Moreover, we can study the eﬀects of a change in average social participation. A greater mp
increases m
p and decreases both m
o and h, while a greater mo decreases m
p and increases both
m
o and h. Importantly, if we take into account that individual choices feed back on average social
participation, this result means that there is a reinforcing mechanism that magniﬁes exogenous shocks
in average social participation. For instance, a small negative shock, say 1%, in average participation
in Putnam’s groups can generate further reductions in individual participation in Putnam’s groups
and increases in both work time and participation in Olson’s groups. Hence, in the new equilibrium
average participation to Putnam’s groups can be lowered well beyond the initial 1%.
94 Data, Empirical Strategy and Results
We estimate a linearized version of the system (2)-(4). Our identifying assumption will be, as implied
by (5)-(6)-(7), that mo directly aﬀects only m
o and that mp directly aﬀects only m
p.
We use a cross-sectional dataset from the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS) for the period 1975-
2004. We select such a dataset because it contains information on both work hours and social
participation. The GSS provides a rich database containing more than forty-ﬁve thousands obser-
vations distributed on about thirty years. Typically, survey waves are carried out once every two
years, though some times they have been carried out more frequently. Sampling strategy aims at
representing current population, with some wave being exceptionally built to over-represent demo-
graphic group (e.g., blacks) for special purpose investigations. Unfortunately, the variables which
are relevant to our analysis are missing in some waves. For this reason we end up using observations
only for the years 1975, 1977, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1993, 2004, for a total of about 8,000
observations out of more than 40,000.
We enlarge the set of variables that appear in (5)-(7) to include several controls at both the
individual and the regional level. In particular, we want to control for individual heterogeneity,
wages, prices, regional shocks and time shocks. For this purpose we include as regressors: reported
health, gender, race, age, years of education, household income (other than individually earned),
regional unemployment, presence and number of children in the household, size of the household,
marital status, year dummies, and regional dummies (as deﬁned by the U.S. Bureau of Census). A
more detailed deﬁnition of these variables is given in the Appendix.
Actually, we do not have exact information about the time spent in Putnam’ or Olson’s groups.
We try to cope with this problem by assuming that the number of groups one belongs to is a proxy of
the time devoted to social participation. More precisely, we measure participation in Olson’s group
by summing up the number of memberships in the following kinds of groups: farm organizations,
unions, professional organizations, and fraternities. Similarly, we measure participation in Putnam’s
group by summing up the number of memberships in the following kinds of groups: fraternal groups,
service groups, sport groups, hobby clubs, art and literary clubs, church organizations, political
10parties, and national organizations.4 Moreover, local social participation is measured by average
individual participation for each U.S. census region in a given year. Variables m
o, m
p, mo, and mp
are reinterpreted accordingly.
Under these assumption and deﬁnitions we estimate the following linearized version of (2)-(4):
h = a1 + a2m
o + a3m
p + ahXh + h (13)
m
o = b1 + b2h + b3m
p + b4mo + bmoXmo + mo (14)
m
p = c1 + c2h + c3m
o + c4mp + cmpXmp + mp (15)
where ai, bi and ci, with i = 1;:::;5, are scalars, ah, bmo and cmp are vectors of reals, and Xh, Xmo
and Xmp are the matrices of controls (demographic and socio-economic at both the individual and
regional level) for the choice of, respectively, h, mo and mp.
We estimate the empirical model (13)-(15) with 3-Stages Least Square (3SLS). Our choice is
based on the computational advantages of 3SLS as well as on the fact that 3SLS do not require to
impose special restrictions on h, mo and mp – only the standard orthogonality conditions with
respect to the exogenous variables.
The most relevant estimates of our model are reported in the Table 4. Further details on the
estimation can be found in the Appendix. Figures indicate that h and m
p aﬀect each other neg-
atively, as expected. Moreover, m




p have no direct eﬀect on each other – though they do have an indirect
eﬀect through h. Most importantly, m




p, both as expected.
Roughly, these estimates are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model. We ﬁnd it
important to emphasize four points in this regard. First, evidence is consistent with the hypothesis
4Participation in the last two organizations might be though of as instrumentally motivated, diﬀerently from what
we assume here. Indeed, their classiﬁcation is particularly diﬃcult, as the actual motivation of participation can
vary from person to person and across countries. In any case, excluding these organizations from the measure of
non-instrumental social participation does not aﬀect the quality of our results.
11dependent variable: h estimated coeﬃcient z-stat
m




p estimated coeﬃcient z-stat





o estimated coeﬃcient z-stat
h   0:001  0:13
m
p   0:027  0:25
mo 0:858*** 6:12
Table 1:  means signiﬁcant at 10%,  means signiﬁcant at 5%,  means signiﬁcant at 1%; h
is hours worked per week, m
p is the number of Putnam’s groups the individual belongs to, m
p is
the number of Olson’s groups the individual belongs to, mp is the regional average memberships in
Putnam’s groups, and mo is the regional average memberships in Olson’s groups.
of a bi-directional inﬂuence between hours worked and participation in Putnam’s groups. This is
consistent with the idea that relational goods and material goods are, at least partially, substitutes.
Second, while evidence is consistent with the idea that participation in Olson’s groups increases
the number of hours worked, it seems that the reverse causation does to hold: more hours worked
does not increase participation in Olson’s groups. Admittedly, this was not expected. However, it is
not necessarily at odd with the hypothesis that instrumental social participation and hours worked
are complements in the production function of material goods. Indeed, given the small number
of Olson’s groups recorded in the GSS, greater participation might take the form of more intense
participation to the same number of Olson’s groups. This would not show up in our ﬁgures.
Third, participation in Olson’s groups and participation in Putnam’s groups seem not to aﬀect
each other directly, but through their impact on the number of hours worked in the market. This is
consistent with the idea that a greater participation in Olson’s groups generates a lesser participation
12in Putnam’s groups through an increase in the returns to work.
Fourth, average regional participation in Olson’ and Putnam’s groups increases the probability
of individual participation in the same groups. This is consistent with the hypothesis that a greater
average social participation increases the returns to individual participation.
Overall, our ﬁgures suggest that a small exogenous shock to average social participation can
generate further important changes in individual behaviour that amplify the initial shock and that
result in the economy shifting towards a new equilibrium where average social participation and work
hours are substantially diﬀerent. If this mechanism is at work, then it might have important policy
implications. The relevance of these, however, would crucially depend on the order of magnitude of
the mentioned eﬀects.
We can attempt to provide a measure of such an order of magnitude. Using our estimates, we
can calculate changes in equilibrium work hours and social participation induced by small exogenous
shocks to, respectively, average participation in Olson’s groups and Putnam’s groups. We consider
the system (13)-(15) where, according to Table 4, we insert our ﬁgures and set equal to zero the




h  1 + 1:860mo   0:656mp (16)
m
o  2 + 0:850mo (17)
m
p  3   0:614mo + 0:906mp (18)
where 1, 2 and 3 are coeﬃcients that only depend on a1, a2, a3, ahXh, bmoXmo, cmpXmp, and
therefore are independent of mo and mp.
As one can see, exogenous shocks to average social participation are far from being innocuous.
For instance, a negative shock of :1 on average regional participation in Putnam’s groups generates
a :09 decrease in individual participation in Putnam’s groups and a :066 increase in hours worked.
A negative shock of :1 on average regional participation in Olson’s groups generates a :085 decrease
13in individual participation in Olson’s groups, a :061 increase in individual participation in Putnam’s
groups, and a :186 increase in hours worked.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we dealt with three issues concerning the relationship between social participation
and hours worked. Social participation is the component of social capital that measures individuals’
engament in groups, associations and non-governmental organizations. The ﬁrst issue we dealt
with is about the causal link between social participation and hours worked. We argue that both
directions of causation might be present. We formalize this idea with a theoretical model that is
empirically tested on U.S. data from the General Social Survey. Estimates turn out to be consistent
with causation going from social participation to hours worked and viceversa.
The second issue is whether diﬀerent forms of social participation show diﬀerent relationships
with hours worked. This question arises from the evidence that diﬀerent forms of social partici-
pation have diﬀerent impacts on subjective well-being. Indeed Bartolini et al. (2011) show that
non-instrumental social participation is positively correlated with subjective well being while in-
strumental social participation is negatively correlated with subjective well-being. We posit that
instrumental social participation is a complement to labor in the production of material goods, while
non-instrumental social participation is an input in the production of relational goods. Moreover,
we assume that relational goods and material goods are partial substitutes. These assumption imply
a positive relationship between instrumental social participation and hours worked, and a nega-
tive relationship between non-instrumental social participation and hours worked. Also in this case
estimates turn out to be substantially consistent with the theoretical model.
The third issue is about the eﬀect of the social environments on hours worked. In particular, we
argue that a greater average social participation increases the reward to individual social participa-
tion, and hence it fosters individual social participation. Estimates turn out to be consistent with
this hypothesis too. More precisely, we estimate that an exogenous shock in average social partici-
pation can generate further important changes in individual behaviour that amplify the initial shock
14and that result in the economy shifting towards a new equilibrium where average social participation
and work hours are substantially diﬀerent.
These ﬁndings suggest the possibility of a self-reinforcing mechanism. Whenever average instru-
mental social participation increases or non-instrumental social participation decreases, people react
by dedicating more time to work, and such an extra work time ends up deteriorating non-instrumental
social participation and fostering instrumental social participation. This in turn triggers a further
reaction that forces individuals into more work, and so on and so forth.
Such a perspective may have important implications for unemployment policies. Traditionally,
therapies to reduce unemployment have attempted to increase labor demand. However, a diﬀerent
strategy might be available which focuses on reducing labor supply. In particular, policies aimed
at increasing increasing non-instrumental social participation could have a positive impact on un-
employment through a contraction of the labor supply. This is in line with the recent claim that
relational activities can be the target of public policies (Rogers et al., 2010; Helliwell, 2011; Bartolini,
2011).
Furthermore, our results can help to shed some light on an important stylized fact regarding
work hours. Available evidence shows a substantial cross-country variability in the trends of hours
worked in the market during the last ﬁfty years. In particular, the diﬀerence between the trends
of work hours in the U.S. and Europe is striking. In the mid-1970s the average British, German,
and Frenchman worked from 5% to 10% more than the average American; however, thirty years
later they were working from 70% to 75% of the average American (see, e.g., Prescott, 2004; Alesina
et al., 2006; Stiglitz, 2008). Prescott (2004) attributes such diﬀerences to cross-country diﬀerences in
labor income taxes. According to Blanchard (2004) the key is instead the diﬀerent preferences about
consumption-leisure ratios between Europeans and Americans. Since, diﬀerently from the U.S., the
trend of social capital has not been found to be decreasing in Europe (Sarracino, 2009), our results
suggest to explore the possibility that the diﬀerences in work hours between Europe and U.S. are in
part explained by diﬀerent trends in social capital.
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17Appendix
The U.S. General Social Survey (dataset 1972-2004)
Hours worked per week: reported hours worked last week (GGS source variable: hhtot)
#Putnam’s: number of memberships in Putnam’s groups: fraternal groups, service groups, sport groups, hobby clubs,
art and literary clubs, church organizations, political parties, and national organizations (GSS source variable: mfrat,
msrv, msport, mhobby, mart, mchurch, mpolit, mnation)
#Olsons’s: number of memberships in Olson’s groups: farm organizations, unions, professional organizations, and
fraternities (GSS source variable: munion, mfarm, mprof, mfratern)
Female: 1 if subject is female (GSS source variable: sex)
Age: number of years since born (GSS source variable: age)
Age squared: age to the power of 2 (GSS source variable: age)
Black: 1 if respondent deﬁnes himself afro-American (GSS source variable: race)
Other non-white: 1 if respondent neither deﬁnes himself as white nor afro-American (GSS source variable: race)
Years of education: number of years the respondent declared to have attended school (GSS source variable: educ)
Working: 1 if respondent declares to have a job (GSS source variable: wrkstat)
Household income: reported household income as provided in the GSS (variable name: coninc) divided by 1000 (dollars
2000) (GSS source variable: coninc)
Household size: number of reported household members (GSS source variable: hompop)
Number of Children: reported number of children (GSS source variable: childs)
Married: 1 if respondent reports to be currently married (GSS source variable: marstat)
Separated: 1 if respondent reports to be currently separated (GSS source variable: marstat)
Divorced: 1 if respondent reports to be currently divorced (GSS source variable: marstat)
Widowed: 1 if respondent reports to be currently widowed (GSS source variable: marstat)
Self-rated health: (range 1-4, dummies) (GSS source variable: hlthsat)
US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
Regional unemployment: average regional unemplyment provided by the US Dept of Commerce
18Descriptive statistics for coded variables
Variable #Obs. Mean. Std.Dev. Min. Max.
hours worked 44866 24.57077 22.94223 0 89
# Putnam’s 20458 0.9948187 1.188773 0 8
# Olson’s 20536 0.3643845 0.6024991 0 4
Regional average Putnam’s 27182 0.9940749 0.1570895 0.5789474 1.55
regional average Olson’s 27182 0.3652875 0.0829673 0.0921053 0.675
health 1st rated 34975 0.3137956 0.464041 0 1
health 2nd rated 34975 0.4456326 0.4970425 0 1
health 3rd rated 34975 0.1842745 0.3877134 0 1
female 46510 0.5606106 0.4963181 0 1
age 46344 45.26474 17.48464 18 89
age squared 46344 2354.603 1754.712 324 7921
black 46510 0.1375833 0.3444658 0 1
other non-white race 46510 0.0350677 0.183953 0 1
education 46369 12.60765 3.166813 0 20
education squared 46369 168.9813 78.22348 0 400
other source of income 36414 349.5479 562.4338 -1049.74 10383.03
regional unemployment 38882 0.0632316 0.018056 0.028 0.125
# children 46351 1.964316 1.812595 0 8
household size 46504 2.730346 1.539986 1 16
married 46502 0.555417 0.4969248 0 1
separated 46502 0.1161025 0.3203513 0 1
divorced 46502 0.0349447 0.1836418 0 1
widowed 46502 0.1003398 0.3004557 0 1
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables as coded for the analysis. Data source: U.S. General
Social Survey for the yeras years 1972-2004.
193SLS estimation: System of three equations
eq. by indep. variable #obs. #params. RMSE R2 2 p-value
hours worked h 7945 37 20.5374 0.1897 3031.42 0.0000
#Putnam’s m
p 7945 36 1.2616 -0.1166 846.56 0.0000
#Olson’s m
o 7945 36 0.5577 0.1573 1777.50 0.0000
Equations by independent variables
regressors hours worked #Putnam’s #Olson’s
Coef. z stat Coef. z stat Coef. z stat
hours worked h . . -0.0326 -5.17 -0.00064 -0.13
#Putnam’s m
p -6.5383 -2.26 . . -0.02656 -0.25
#Olson’s m
o 15.3787 3.17 0.1505 0.45 . .
reg. Putnam’s  mp . . 0.6913 4.43 . .
reg. Olson’s  mo . . . . 0.85765 6.12
health 1st rated 12.5966 9.52 0.6144 6.26 0.05907 0.69
health 2nd rated 12.2907 9.92 0.5757 5.97 0.05591 0.69
health 3rd rated 6.4251 5.54 0.2814 3.55 0.02371 0.48
female -8.6915 -10.22 -0.3538 -4.39 -0.15343 -2.63
age 1.3303 12.67 0.0559 5.43 0.01195 1.43
age squared -0.0170 -16.71 -0.0006 -4.82 -0.00011 -1.16
black -0.7843 -1.06 0.0108 0.24 -0.02238 -1.15
other non-white -1.2017 -0.83 -0.1383 -1.56 -0.08555 -2.06
education 1.5271 2.54 0.0239 0.61 -0.09741 -9.86
education squared -0.0311 -0.87 0.0048 2.04 0.00689 8.93
other source of income -0.0033 -5.68 . . . .
reg. unemployment -44.2766 -2.43 . . . .
# children -0.4028 -2.42 -0.0124 -1.18 -0.00307 -0.62
household size -0.3869 -1.87 0.0023 0.18 0.00069 0.12
married 2.6180 3.44 0.0743 1.54 0.01783 0.76
separated 5.5460 5.64 0.1850 2.58 0.04059 1.01
divorced 2.2193 1.59 0.0580 0.67 0.00744 0.19
widowed 4.4977 3.98 0.1515 2.01 -0.01339 -0.35
year dummies yes . yes . yes .
regional dummies yes . yes . yes .
constant -13.1151 -2.77 -1.7286 -6.67 -0.18692 -1.02
Table 3: Estimates of the system (13)-(15) using 3SLS. The top table reports overall statistics and
tests. The bottom table reports point estimates and z-values for each equation, regressor by regressor.
A line separates regressors on which this paper focuses from regressors that are used as controls.
The ﬁrst column reports the name of regressors, the second and third columns report the estimates
for equation (13) with hours worked as independent variable, the forth and ﬁfth columns report
the estimates for equation (14) with memberships in Putnam’s group as independent variable, and
the sixth and seventh columns report the estimates for equation (15) with memberships in Olson’s
groups as independent variable. The omitted category of reported health is 4th (worst) rated.
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